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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ST~\Tf•~ OF' PTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
1unn:RT \VA YNE GLEASON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
18467 
;-,TATI~i\Il<~Nrr OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Tlw appellant -..vas charged for the crime of rape and 
l'arnal knowlc1dg(', and convicted upon jury trial of rape, 
l'rnm whi('h eonvietion he appeals. 
Dl::-)POSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The up1wllant was charged by information for the 
r·1illt1 ' ()f l'HJH' in violation of 76-53-15, UCA (1953) and 
2 
for tlie crime of carnal knowledcre in violation of '"ii'-,.-, 
b J .).,_ 
19, UCA (1953). He enterPd a })lea of not cruilt\7 and 
b • ( ]1(1( 
guilty by reasons of insanity. lipon jury trial in tli" 
Third .Judicial District for Salt Lake County, lwforp !]
1
, 
Honorable 1\Ierrill C. Faux, ,J udgP, the appellant ira, 
found guilty of rape and -was committed to tlw Utah f:ltati· 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGH11 ON APPEAL 
The apvelant seeks reversal of the conviction and :i 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State charges that on April 14, 1963, a Faun 
Dotson (Mrs. Faun Tillery at the time of trial), aged li, 
was raped by the appellant, (R-1). The prosecutrix tt'sti-
fied that on the night of April 1-t, 19G3 at approxirnatl'h 
10 :30 p.m. she was standing on the northeast corner 11i 
T'hirteenth South and State Street in Salt Lake Cit1. 
Utah, waiting to catch a bus in order to return to lwr 
mother's home in \Vest Jordan. Prior to this time she had 
been visiting -with her boyfriend at his home 011 Thir 
teenth South and Second 1£ast Streets where she !ml 
spent the day. (R-72,88). As she waited on tlw cornerfo: 
the bus, the appellant struck up a conversation with li1'" 
He then thrust a hard object in hPr back, which she dP' 
cribed as a gun, and demanded that she follow him. 1H· 
78). Tlwreupon both proceeded to a iwarhy alle;· wlii·i· 
• 
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''l'i"'liant a:-::-:aultcd her (H-:25), removed her clothing, 
tlii f'\\- 11('!' to tilt> ground and allt>gedly forced intercourse 
I, U-l~J,S0,~-11 ). TIH·n·after, nliss Doh;on returned to the 
J1011H ()J' 11(•1' boyl'riend and the police were notified. After 
tlw arrirnJ of tl1P police she was taken to the 8alt Lake 
Count) II ospital where she was examined by Dr. David 
A. Hanc:Pll ( H-G/) who testified that said examination 
indirnL<·d that the prosecuting witness had sperm im-
pla11l1·d "itl1in h<·r vagina within 48 hours of his examin-
a1 i11J1 (H-/(1). 
l'unrna11t to tlw plea of "Not Guilty by reason of ln-
:--anity", tl1P pros<>eution Pntered a "Petition for Examina-
i inn a::; to ;-.lanity". (R-3) On June 25, 1963 a hearing as 
111 tlH· sanit)' of the appellant was held at which time it 
11as (l\'t<·nni1wcl that the appellant was not competent to 
:-;tand trial. A<'cordingly, he was committed to the Utah 
:-;1at<· llospital to remain in custody until such time as he 
11a:-; (·0111pdent to he triPd (R-15,lG). On July 17, 196-l: 
lltt> ;1p1wlla11t was hrnught to trial (R-65). 
During the <'OUl'se of the trial Dr. Richard C. Gilmore 
and Dr. Hog('l' 8. Kriger, psychiatrists who examined the 
<IJlJH'llant liy onlPr of tlw trial court (R-128), were called 
l1y tl1» appellant to testify as to the mental condition of 
'ilw appt llaut.Hoth testified that the appellant as of June 
111, l'.iii:J, th<· dat<' when he was committed to the Utah 
~tat(• Hospital, was grossly psychotic, delusional, and 
'lll'f\'l'i1112· from an aente sd1izophrPnic reaction of a para-
4 
noid typP (R-119, 120, 129). During his direct (~xamination 
Drfl Gilmore descrilwd such condition as follows: 
He had the delusion that he had to get out oi 
the hospital first, hefore we killed him or th~ 
sherjff killed him, so he could do away with sorn,, 
1wr:son or persons, and he interpreted thi:s as lw 
ing hi:s respon:sihility to society-to protect so 
ciet:T. He was hallucinating and he was hearinr, . - ..... 
voices. He was standing by the window and se(~ill~ 
people, of which he could not describe; and, h; 
this, l mean he was grossly thought disordereci, 
was unable to really give much history as to tlw 
difficulties in which he finds himself, but-tliat 
is -what I mean by his being grossly psychotic. 
(H-119) 
Neither of the doctors were able to form opnnons con-
cerning the mental condition of tlw appelant as of thr· 
date of the alleged commission of the offense (R-120,129). 
However, in answer to the question as to whether a mental 
condition such as app{~llant's development over a iwriorl 
of time, Dr. Gilmore answerPd: "It is my opinion that 
this would lw possible." (R-121). On redirt-'ct t-'xaminatio11 
Dr. Gilmore also testifit~d that a person suffering undfl· ;1 
mental condition such as that ascribed to appellant would 
not be capabl<~ of understanding the difference hehre1·11 
right and wrong and would not be able to control hi> 
impulses ( R-126). Dr. Kriger testified that in his opinic·11 
the appellant could, at the snap of a fingPr, revert to tJi. 
mental condition described above (R-13G) vVhc'n ash,] 
whether the appellant on April lJ, 19G3 knew the natmr· 
1 
-
5 
,,; Joreiug sorneone to have intercourse with him, Dr. 
l.\:rig<·1· ans\\'Pn'd: "I have never been in a position to 
knO\r.'' ( H-13-1-). 'l'he answer of Dr. Gilmore to a similar 
qnr•stion, i.e. whether appellant on April 14, 1963 knew the 
(lifl'<'n'11ee lwhn'Pn right and wrong both leagally and 
11wrall.\- was: "l could not testify to this, sir." (R-123) 
Over the objection of the appellant, the trial court 
took from the jury the consideration of the plea, "Not 
Cnilty by HPason of Instanity"; refused to grant appel-
lant's re(pwsted i11structions on that issue and advised 
jury to disregard entirely any evidence respecting said 
pl Pa ( H-3-1-). '11 he trial court also refused to include ver-
liatim the language of 76-1-21 UCA (1964), 1953 (R-47,-
J-l-0) and denied appellant's request that the jury be in-
structed with respect to the lesser included offense of 
"assault with intent to commit rape." (R-138). Other 
pt•rtinent facts appear below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THE APPELLANT WAS SANE ON 
THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE OF-
FENSE. 
The ap1wllant does not dispute the proposition that 
it is inemubent upon the defense to come forth with evi-
dViil'(' which must preponderate in favor of insanity in 
order that the issue of insanity may be propl~dy ;;u]i. 
mitt<,d to the J·m·v. State r. Brown :iti lTtah .f(i 3~ 1()·> ]> . ' ' ' ._ ' 
G-H (1909). The appellant's position is that tlH' Pvid<'Jl(·p 
submitted in support of the plea of not guilty by n•ason of 
insanity ·was sufficient to have that issue submitted to tltl' 
JUry. 
In analyzing the evidence at trial, the court's att<·n-
tion is called to State ·r. Brou;u, supra ·wherein tlw court 
stated. 
If the state of the evidence upon the issnr of 
insanity had been such as to pennit rcasona/J/e 
nien to arrive at different conclusions ·when con-
sidered in connection with the presumption of 
sanity, then the qitestion U'o1ild be one of fact 
merely, and we would be powerless to infer. Id. 
at 59. (emphasis adde-d) 
Also see State v. Hadley 65 Utah 109, 23+, p 94:0 (1925): 
8tatr L Hockett, 238 p. 539 (Kan. 1951) 
As to what quantum of evidl•nce the accused must 
introduce, the case of State v. Green 78 Utah 580, Gp. lil 
( 1931) is pertinent, wherein the court stated: 
The correct rule is that the presumption of 
sanity prevails only until such time ~s evi.de1m 
is received at trial which tends to sho1.i1 msmuty · · · 
-when the trial judge shall defrrmine that there i> 
som(' evidence which t0nds to show the accuse<l 
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\ms irrnane at the ti1ne of tlw alleged offenst>, then 
it IH•emn«s his duty to submit such question to the 
jlll".\'· Ir/. at 5%. ( ('lll]Jhasis adcl<>d) 
TIH' fon·going rule is the pn·vailing rule in most jurisdic-
tions. Tut11111 r. l·. 8., 190 F. 2d Gl2, 615 (D. C. Cir.1951). 
T11·0 ol' tlu• rnon-' rPeent casPs whieh deal with this ques-
tion n·qnin• that only "slight" evidence of the accused's 
111:-:an it,\' at 1 h(• tiuu• of the• all<•ged commission of the of-
1.!'ll:-i(' is n·qui n•cl to make such issue a question of fact. 
J/1!11 u1rl r. 1 ·.s .. :2:3:2 F. 2nd :27-1:, 27fi (5th Cir. 1956); Hurt 
1, l'.8., :t'.7 V :2n<l 978 (8th Cir.19fi-t). 
\\'hen measured by the above rules and standards, 
it i-.: d(•ar tliat the t>vidence produced by the appellant in 
tl11· (·as<· at bar pertaining to the issue of his insanity at 
tlw tirn<· of th<> a]Jpged commission of the offense was of 
c-nd1 ('LanwtPr as sufficient to raise a question of fact 
tl1P1PlJy rec1uiring the trial court to submit such quPstion 
\11 1 Ii(' jlll',\'. 
). <'Onsideration of the entire testimony of both Drs. 
(; ilrnon• and Kriger is cPrtainly sufficient to demonstrate 
tliat n·asonahll' mPn could arrive at different conclusions 
011 th<· liasis of such testimony. Both doctors testified that 
11n .J llJl<' to, 19fi3, tlw date of their first examination of 
ll1(· ap1H·llant, !1P was grossly psychotic, dPlusional and 
~u!'l't·rning from an acute schizophrenic reaction of the 
J1:trm1oi<l tnw. \Yhile neither was able to tPstify that 
appdla11t \\as insmw as of April 1-t, 1963, more import-
8 
antly, neither was able to testify that he was not i 118011 , 
at that time. (R-120, 123, 129, 13-±) Furthermore, Dr. (;j\_ 
more's testimony that the mental condition undPr whidi 
appellant was suffering on June 10, 1963 could hayr· 
developed over a period of time is, at the very lea~t, 
evidence which tends to show that appellant was legalh 
insane at the critical time. 
vVhen the appellant attempted to introduce the ''Or-
der Appointing Designated Examiners" and the attached 
report as evidence, the trial court erroneously exclnt!Pd 
the same on the grounds that the information contaim·11 
in such report was "too remote" from the issue involnrl 
in the case (R-122). The evidentiary value of the report 
lies in the fact that it contains critical evidence slw11ing 
that appellant had a history of mental illness and received 
treatments therefor while serving in the U. S. l\larirw 
Corps approximately one and one-half years prior to th1· 
examination conducted in connection with the instant 
case. The treatments consisted of medication and electrn-
convulsive therapy which was administered at the naya\ 
hospital in Oakland, California (R-13). r:l'he rPpori 
also shows that appellant suffered other "attacks." Such 
evidence is critical in demonstrating that the apprllant 
had suffered from mental disorders prior to the time of 
the incident complained of in the case at bar, and brco1w» 
even more significant ·when viewed in connection witl: 
Dr. Kriger's testimony that the nature of appellant'' 
mental illness was such that he could, at the ··~map of n 
9 
i!11::,11," r1·ynt tote acute selwzophrenic, delusional state 
Jw \I;\;; i11 on .J urn• 10, 19G:3. All of this evidence consid-
1·1('d tngl'tlu•r ad('quatdy falls within the language of 
;..,·1 (!/ ,. t'. U rec n, supra. 
'l'l1c trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury 
\\ itli n·sp(·d to the nect>ssity of finding a joint operation 
,r1· af'1 and intent in the crime charged as prescrihed hy 
l!i-1-:.!0 <llld /(i-1-~1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, consti-
l ilt('(l Pl'l'Or for the same reasons enumerated ahove. 
7()-1-20. In PVery crime or puhlic offens2 
t!1Pn' urnst exist a union or joint operation of act 
and intent, or criminal negligence. 
IG-1-21. The intent or intention is manifested 
h.\· tlw circumstances connect2d with the offense 
and tht> sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
A 11 an· of sound mind who are neither idiots, nor 
lwl1i<>s nor affectt>d with insanity. 
i 1 i:~ <'l<·nr that infrnt is an t~ssential ingredient of the 
1·ri11h· of rapt> and that the above statute defines intent 
ti! t1·rn1s of "tlw sound mind and discretion of the ac-
1·11'.'1·11. ., lnknt must he shown before an act constitutes 
a cr111w, ancl intent cannot he shown without evidence 
,,i· :;1>lll1d ll1ind and discretion. State v. Broicn, op. cit. 
,,t :1.-.;, Tims the trial court erred in failing to instruct 
t111• .im.\- in nceorclance ·with tlw above statutP. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO Ifi-
STRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE LESSER E\-
CLUDED OFFENSE OF "ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO 
COMMIT RAPE." 
77 -33-G Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty or 
any offense the commission of which is n0epssar-
ily included in that with which he is charged in tlw 
indictment or information or of an attempt to 
commit the offense. 
In construing this statute this court has consistently hrld 
that when the evidence permits the trial court is und,'r 
the obligation to instruct the jury with respect to am 
offenses included in the charged offense. State v. Bly/111, 
20 Utah 378, 58 P. 1108 (1899); State v. Hymns, G-1 l'tnl1 
285, 28G, 230 P. 349 (1924); State v. ColJo, 90 lTtah 89. 
103, 60 P. 2d 960 (193G); State v. Smith, 90 lTtali JS~. 
495, 62 P. 2d 1110 (193G). 
In the instant case, the trial court's refusal con~ti­
tutes reversal error. The appellant surely requested ai1 
instruction on assault with the intent to commit ra1w 
( R. 138). The paradox of the trial court's position JiP~ 
in the fact that it did instruct the jury with resped t11 
the lesser included offenses of battery and simple as~aull 
11 
1 j(. +:!, +:~, H). Adoption hy thP trial court of such a 
1 111~;itim1 an:-;w<>rs, jn itsPlf, any contention which might 
Jw advane<'d that the evidenre producPd at trial was not 
, 11 !'1'icient to permit the court to instruct as to the lesser 
j 11 ('J\lderl off('nsc~ of assault with intent to commit rape. 
~inee it is a fundamental rule of law that the offense 
ol a:-;smdt with intent to commit rape is included in the 
1·iuµ;<· or rape, it is unnecessary to cite the numerous 
mitlwriti<•:-; which so hold. State v. Blythe, op. cit; State 
r. Smith, op. cit. Furthc~rmore, since simple assault is a 
l1•sser includ('d offense of assault with intent to commit 
rape, 8/({f e ?". llymns, op. cit. at 28G, and the jury was 
111st nw1 <·cl with respPct to simple assault, it would of 
m·n·c-:.;it,Y follow that the evidence was sufficient to re-
qnin· tliat the trial court instruct with respect to the 
off1•nse as assault ·with intent to commit rape. 
Jn th<-• f'ase of State v. Blythe, 20 Ftah 378, 58 P. 1108 
(1S99), tlw court stated: 
WhPn, therefore, the defendant was charged 
\\·ith and tried for the completed offense of rape, 
it was cornvetent for the jury as provided in sec-
tion -1-S93, R.S. to find him guilty of assault with 
intent to commit rape, if in their judgment, the 
Pvidenf'(~ warranted; and the court in so charging 
thP jury committed no error, there being evidence 
to justfy the charge and sustain the judgment 
PV1·n though from the evidence the offense of rape 
was actually complPted, tlw jury had the power to 
eonvict dt>frndant of the lesser offense, however 
illogieal sneh <'Onvietion may sPem. Id. at 381. 
12 
See also State 1'. Smailes, 51 Idaho 321, 5 P. 2d ~1 -111 
(1931); People v. BalJcock, 160 Cal. 537, 117 P. 5-111 
(1911); People v. Parker, 74 Cal. App. 540, 241 P. -±01 
( 1925). Therefore, tlw trial judge in the instant cas1., 
by refusing to instruct the jury with respect to the of. 
fense of assault with intent to commit rape, <lPprivPd 
the jury of their right and power "to find the accusPd 
guilty of a lesser or included offense,'' and in so refu~in~ 
the lower court in effect made a determination of stat, 
of the evidence as a matter of law to the prejudice of (Ji, 
rights of the d::>fendant, State v. Hyams, G-1 Utah 2S~:, 
230 P. 349 (1924). 
The matter of lesser inrluded offenses is succintl) ' 
clarified and summarized by Mr. Justice Straup in Stat, 
v. Ferguson, wherein he states that as a general ruh' 
where there is sufficient evidence to justify a convietion 
of a charged greater offense, there must of necessit; 
also be sufficent evidence to justify a conviction of tl11' 
included lesser offense if all the Pssentials of the le~sP1 
are embraced in the greater. As was noted abovP, a~sault 
with intent to commit rap0 is such an offernw. .J ustir' 1 
Straup then observes: 
In such a case the one offense is charged and 
presented by tlH' indictment or information ju~i 
as much as is the other. Being so charged and 
presented, the accused, by his plea of not guilty ti 
put on trial for the one just as much as for tlw 
othe1· offense and may be convicted of either. Stolr 
v. Ferguson, 7-1- Utah 26~3, 2G7, 279 P. 55 (19~~)) 
(eon curring-). 
13 
Tlw holdings of the above cases show that the appel-
lant was entitled to the jury's consideration of the offense 
of assault with intent to commit rape under the offense 
ci 1arged and hi:::; plea thereto. The trial court's refusal to 
~o in:-;truct the jury constituted prejudicial error. 
CONOLUSION 
Since the trial court (1) erroneously determined the 
qtw~tion of appellant's sanity or insanity as of April 14, 
J 9(ii) as a matter of law; ( 2) refused to instruct the jury 
\rith respect to the element of intent as prescribed by 
7G 1-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and (3) refused to 
instruet tlw jury as to the lesser included offense of 
assault with intent to commit rape, appellant asserts that 
such error:::; were prejudicial and require a reversal of 
thl:' trial court's judgment and a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JIM MIT8UNAGA, 
Legal Defender 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
